Santosh
Verma
Verma
The NDA government brought a new
scheme the Prime Minister Kisan Samman Nidhi (PM-KISAN) that became operational
from 1st December 2018. It aimed to provide small and marginal
farmers (SMFs) financial assistance to procure various inputs to ‘ensure proper
crop health and appropriate yields’. It also aimed to protect these farmers
from middlemen and moneylenders. SMFs were defined as the farmer families who
collectively own cultivable land upto 2 hectares. According to the Agricultural
Census (2015), the small and marginal holdings if taken together constituted around
13.78 crores (1378 lakhs) that is 86.08 percent of the total holdings in
2015-16.
scheme the Prime Minister Kisan Samman Nidhi (PM-KISAN) that became operational
from 1st December 2018. It aimed to provide small and marginal
farmers (SMFs) financial assistance to procure various inputs to ‘ensure proper
crop health and appropriate yields’. It also aimed to protect these farmers
from middlemen and moneylenders. SMFs were defined as the farmer families who
collectively own cultivable land upto 2 hectares. According to the Agricultural
Census (2015), the small and marginal holdings if taken together constituted around
13.78 crores (1378 lakhs) that is 86.08 percent of the total holdings in
2015-16.
What
the PM-KISAN Scheme Is?
the PM-KISAN Scheme Is?
The
PM-KISAN scheme is supposed to provide a payment of Rs. 6000 per year to SMFs
in their Aadhar linked bank accounts in three equal instalments of Rs. 2000
each in every four months. For the households who were not having Aadhar linked
bank accounts, they were supposed to provide alternate prescribed documents for
identity verification to get the benefit of the first instalment under the
scheme. But, for subsequent payment of instalments, Aadhar linked bank account
was made compulsory.For the year 2018-19, the government of India allocated 20
thousand crores and for the year 2019-20, an allocation of 75 thousand croreswere
made to run the PM-KISAN scheme.
PM-KISAN scheme is supposed to provide a payment of Rs. 6000 per year to SMFs
in their Aadhar linked bank accounts in three equal instalments of Rs. 2000
each in every four months. For the households who were not having Aadhar linked
bank accounts, they were supposed to provide alternate prescribed documents for
identity verification to get the benefit of the first instalment under the
scheme. But, for subsequent payment of instalments, Aadhar linked bank account
was made compulsory.For the year 2018-19, the government of India allocated 20
thousand crores and for the year 2019-20, an allocation of 75 thousand croreswere
made to run the PM-KISAN scheme.
Disbursal
of Instalments under the Scheme
of Instalments under the Scheme
An
initial identification of 874.45 lakh SMF households was made among the major
states of India (see Table 1) for the first instalment of Rs. 2000 for each
household for the period December 2018 to March 2019.From these identified SMFs
households, only 821.90 lakh households were the final beneficiaries. The
second instalment was made to 747.88 lakh SMF households which was further
lesser than the first round of beneficiaries. The third instalment was made to
further lesser SMF households (607.22 lakhs) which was a decline of 26.12
percent from the first round of beneficiary households across the major states
of India.
initial identification of 874.45 lakh SMF households was made among the major
states of India (see Table 1) for the first instalment of Rs. 2000 for each
household for the period December 2018 to March 2019.From these identified SMFs
households, only 821.90 lakh households were the final beneficiaries. The
second instalment was made to 747.88 lakh SMF households which was further
lesser than the first round of beneficiaries. The third instalment was made to
further lesser SMF households (607.22 lakhs) which was a decline of 26.12
percent from the first round of beneficiary households across the major states
of India.
All
the states have witnessed a decline in SMF beneficiaries across India between
first and third instalment. But, few states have witnessed a sharp decline in
beneficiary households between subsequent rounds of instalments, for example,
Arunanchal Pradesh (80.68 percent), Jharkhand (71.45), Manipur (59.71), Madhya
Pradesh (54.12), Chhattisgarh (51.03), Meghalaya (48.96), Nagaland (45.48),
Odisha (43.92), Bihar (38.22), Maharashtra (37.96) and Punjab (34.52).
the states have witnessed a decline in SMF beneficiaries across India between
first and third instalment. But, few states have witnessed a sharp decline in
beneficiary households between subsequent rounds of instalments, for example,
Arunanchal Pradesh (80.68 percent), Jharkhand (71.45), Manipur (59.71), Madhya
Pradesh (54.12), Chhattisgarh (51.03), Meghalaya (48.96), Nagaland (45.48),
Odisha (43.92), Bihar (38.22), Maharashtra (37.96) and Punjab (34.52).
Table
1: State-wise Identified SMF Households andBeneficiary Households (in lakhs) and Decline in Beneficiary Households (in %)
1: State-wise Identified SMF Households andBeneficiary Households (in lakhs) and Decline in Beneficiary Households (in %)
|
States
|
Identified SMF Households
|
I Instalment
|
II Instalment
|
III Instalment
|
% decline from I to III
Instalment* |
|
Dec. 18 to March 19
|
April- July 19
|
Aug.- Nov. 19
|
|||
|
Andhra Pradesh
|
51.55
|
50.43
|
41.44
|
41.14
|
18.41
|
|
Arunanchal Pradesh
|
0.53
|
0.43
|
0.16
|
0.08
|
80.68
|
|
Assam
|
30.98
|
26.98
|
23.96
|
19.75
|
26.82
|
|
Bihar
|
53.77
|
50.84
|
46.93
|
31.41
|
38.22
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
19.25
|
18.08
|
15.55
|
8.85
|
51.03
|
|
Goa
|
0.08
|
0.07
|
0.06
|
0.05
|
27.52
|
|
Gujarat
|
46.94
|
47.79
|
46.78
|
43.39
|
9.20
|
|
Haryana
|
15.02
|
14.44
|
14.13
|
13.35
|
7.57
|
|
Himachal Pradesh
|
8.64
|
8.56
|
8.41
|
7.65
|
10.66
|
|
Jammu & Kashmir
|
9.40
|
9.21
|
8.74
|
7.89
|
14.33
|
|
Jharkhand
|
15.14
|
14.44
|
7.44
|
4.12
|
71.45
|
|
Karnataka
|
49.45
|
47.37
|
46.52
|
35.52
|
25.02
|
|
Kerala
|
28.05
|
27.47
|
26.81
|
25.71
|
6.41
|
|
Madhya Pradesh
|
55.19
|
53.24
|
45.61
|
24.42
|
54.12
|
|
Maharashtra
|
87.39
|
80.36
|
67.12
|
49.86
|
37.96
|
|
Manipur
|
1.64
|
1.25
|
0.95
|
0.50
|
59.71
|
|
Meghalaya
|
0.68
|
0.67
|
0.62
|
0.34
|
48.96
|
|
Mizoram
|
0.69
|
0.67
|
0.64
|
0.53
|
21.84
|
|
Nagaland
|
1.67
|
1.61
|
1.57
|
0.88
|
45.48
|
|
Odisha
|
36.55
|
36.29
|
29.07
|
20.35
|
43.92
|
|
Punjab
|
22.32
|
22.30
|
22.15
|
14.61
|
34.52
|
|
Rajasthan
|
59.32
|
48.20
|
46.75
|
36.78
|
23.70
|
|
Sikkim
|
0.09
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
100.00
|
|
Tamil Nadu
|
35.48
|
34.67
|
33.62
|
31.29
|
9.75
|
|
Telangana
|
34.82
|
34.73
|
34.06
|
31.64
|
8.92
|
|
Tripura
|
1.94
|
1.93
|
1.89
|
1.82
|
5.84
|
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
200.90
|
183.15
|
170.31
|
149.29
|
18.49
|
|
Uttarakhand
|
6.99
|
6.72
|
6.57
|
6.00
|
10.68
|
|
West Bengal
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
0.00
|
|
Total
|
874.45
|
821.90
|
747.88
|
607.22
|
26.12
|
Source:
Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers’ Welfare. * Author’s
calculation.
Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers’ Welfare. * Author’s
calculation.
States
like Assam, Goa, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Mizoram, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and
Kashmir and Uttarakhand too have witnessed a major decline in beneficiary
households (see Table 1). Meanwhile the political tussle between the BJP led
Central Government and the Trinamool Congress led Government in West Bengal has
led to neither identification of SMF households nor registration of these
farmers for PM-KISAN scheme leading to zero monetary benefit to farmers in the
state. Sikkim was another state where SMFs were neither identified nor
registered for the scheme, so could not get any monetary benefit.
like Assam, Goa, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Mizoram, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and
Kashmir and Uttarakhand too have witnessed a major decline in beneficiary
households (see Table 1). Meanwhile the political tussle between the BJP led
Central Government and the Trinamool Congress led Government in West Bengal has
led to neither identification of SMF households nor registration of these
farmers for PM-KISAN scheme leading to zero monetary benefit to farmers in the
state. Sikkim was another state where SMFs were neither identified nor
registered for the scheme, so could not get any monetary benefit.
Reasons
of Decline in Beneficiaries
of Decline in Beneficiaries
The
decline in subsequent instalments has been noticed due to the rigidity of the
central government to pay to those SMFs only whose bank accounts are linked
with the Aadhar data base. It has also been witnessed that the state governments,who
are given responsibility to identify and enrol the SMFs on PM-KISAN portal,
could not enrol them and due to the reason a large number of these SMFs could
not get the money into their accounts.
decline in subsequent instalments has been noticed due to the rigidity of the
central government to pay to those SMFs only whose bank accounts are linked
with the Aadhar data base. It has also been witnessed that the state governments,who
are given responsibility to identify and enrol the SMFs on PM-KISAN portal,
could not enrol them and due to the reason a large number of these SMFs could
not get the money into their accounts.
As
mentioned earlier, the scheme was launched by the NDA government barely few
months before the General Election, it can be noticed from the Table 1 that the
first instalment reached to almost 94 percent of the identified SMF households,
but subsequently for later instalments, the number of beneficiary households
declined sharply. It also portrays that in the post-election period, after
getting the second term, the NDA government lost its earlier focus to implement
the scheme. The way the beneficiaries have declined, the scheme may further be
attributed as more an electoral gimmick rather to provide financial assistance
to procure various inputs to ‘ensure proper crop health and appropriate yields’.
mentioned earlier, the scheme was launched by the NDA government barely few
months before the General Election, it can be noticed from the Table 1 that the
first instalment reached to almost 94 percent of the identified SMF households,
but subsequently for later instalments, the number of beneficiary households
declined sharply. It also portrays that in the post-election period, after
getting the second term, the NDA government lost its earlier focus to implement
the scheme. The way the beneficiaries have declined, the scheme may further be
attributed as more an electoral gimmick rather to provide financial assistance
to procure various inputs to ‘ensure proper crop health and appropriate yields’.
Structural
Issues in Indian Agriculture and a DCT like PM-KISAN
Issues in Indian Agriculture and a DCT like PM-KISAN
As
we all know, agriculture in India has been in crisis historically. Efforts for
structural reform in Indian agriculture like land redistribution in the
successive plans were half-hearted and largely unsuccessful due to lack of
political will. Application of the Green Revolution technology on highly skewed
land distribution patterns in India could have only regional and class effects
leaving millions of SMFs without getting benefits of the strategy (Dhanagre
1987). In the neoliberal period, the rollback of the State in the form of
reduction in subsidies to agriculture as a whole (on seeds, fertilizers,
agricultural equipment, irrigation facility, energy, warehouses etc.) and
reduction in rural development expenditure (Jha and Acharya 2011) have invited
further deeper crisis in Indian agriculture. And opening of the domestic agricultural
markets and reduction in export and import duties on agricultural products due
to WTO obligations led to exposure of Indian farmers in the world market. All
these led to first, rise in cost of cultivation, and second; volatility in
input and output prices in agriculture where middlemen and traders, in a near absence
of provisioning and procuring institutions, exploited the farming communities
at their wish. All these longue duree structural bottlenecks in
agriculture, one after another, aggravated the agrarian crisis in India.
we all know, agriculture in India has been in crisis historically. Efforts for
structural reform in Indian agriculture like land redistribution in the
successive plans were half-hearted and largely unsuccessful due to lack of
political will. Application of the Green Revolution technology on highly skewed
land distribution patterns in India could have only regional and class effects
leaving millions of SMFs without getting benefits of the strategy (Dhanagre
1987). In the neoliberal period, the rollback of the State in the form of
reduction in subsidies to agriculture as a whole (on seeds, fertilizers,
agricultural equipment, irrigation facility, energy, warehouses etc.) and
reduction in rural development expenditure (Jha and Acharya 2011) have invited
further deeper crisis in Indian agriculture. And opening of the domestic agricultural
markets and reduction in export and import duties on agricultural products due
to WTO obligations led to exposure of Indian farmers in the world market. All
these led to first, rise in cost of cultivation, and second; volatility in
input and output prices in agriculture where middlemen and traders, in a near absence
of provisioning and procuring institutions, exploited the farming communities
at their wish. All these longue duree structural bottlenecks in
agriculture, one after another, aggravated the agrarian crisis in India.
Since
the neoliberal policies were adopted, the cumulative effort of government of
India is to implement mass income deflationary policies (in the form of
reduction in support to agriculture and as well as reduction in rural
development expenditure). These have dragged the farmers, peasants, landless
agricultural workers into a situation of abandoning agriculture and to become
rural or urban informal workers and many of them have forced themselves to take
extreme steps like committing suicides. It further has created a psychological
downslide before rural communities that if people adopt agriculture as
principal occupation are actually ruining their lives.
the neoliberal policies were adopted, the cumulative effort of government of
India is to implement mass income deflationary policies (in the form of
reduction in support to agriculture and as well as reduction in rural
development expenditure). These have dragged the farmers, peasants, landless
agricultural workers into a situation of abandoning agriculture and to become
rural or urban informal workers and many of them have forced themselves to take
extreme steps like committing suicides. It further has created a psychological
downslide before rural communities that if people adopt agriculture as
principal occupation are actually ruining their lives.
The
PM-KISAN scheme also doesn’t include the most vulnerable rural groups like
agricultural laborers which is estimated around 41.2 percent of the rural
households (Verma and Roy 2019) and households who have leased in land for
livelihoods which account for around 15 percent of the total cultivators in
India in 2012 (Bansal et al. 2018). In such a situation, without reforming the
structural bottlenecks that have hampered agricultural activities and have dragged
farmers into a deep crisis, one may ask how far this scheme will help out the
farmers that too in situation where a significant number of SMFs are left out.
PM-KISAN scheme also doesn’t include the most vulnerable rural groups like
agricultural laborers which is estimated around 41.2 percent of the rural
households (Verma and Roy 2019) and households who have leased in land for
livelihoods which account for around 15 percent of the total cultivators in
India in 2012 (Bansal et al. 2018). In such a situation, without reforming the
structural bottlenecks that have hampered agricultural activities and have dragged
farmers into a deep crisis, one may ask how far this scheme will help out the
farmers that too in situation where a significant number of SMFs are left out.
Questions
are also raised on the practicability of direct cash transfer (DCT)schemes like
PM-KISAN. The champions of DCT argue that digital
transfers of money to the beneficiaries would reduce paper works, eliminate forged
transactions, avoid red tape and will enhance efficiency. It is also argued
that DCT will minimise the misdirection and leakages of the fund as the subsidy,
directly, will go to intended beneficiary.But, earlier, in the non-DCT era, central
government or state governments used to provide subsidies to manufacturers/dealers
to provide seeds, fertilizers, equipment – tractors, pump sets, sprinklers,
etc. on concessional rates and the farmers had to pay his/her share to the
dealer and get the seeds, fertilizers and equipment. Though the system was not
leakage free, but worked for the farmers. Now, farmers have to pay full price
of whatever he/she wants to buy from manufacturers/dealers, so there is a
chance of upward price spiral of these goods through creation of artificial
scarcity – for example, we have seen it in the case of seeds and fertilizers. There
is also fear that in the name of DCT, the government can reduce all other kinds
of subsidies, support to agriculture and also further reduce in rural
development expenditure. If it happens, it will further impact the farmers
badly and aggravate the rural distress.
are also raised on the practicability of direct cash transfer (DCT)schemes like
PM-KISAN. The champions of DCT argue that digital
transfers of money to the beneficiaries would reduce paper works, eliminate forged
transactions, avoid red tape and will enhance efficiency. It is also argued
that DCT will minimise the misdirection and leakages of the fund as the subsidy,
directly, will go to intended beneficiary.But, earlier, in the non-DCT era, central
government or state governments used to provide subsidies to manufacturers/dealers
to provide seeds, fertilizers, equipment – tractors, pump sets, sprinklers,
etc. on concessional rates and the farmers had to pay his/her share to the
dealer and get the seeds, fertilizers and equipment. Though the system was not
leakage free, but worked for the farmers. Now, farmers have to pay full price
of whatever he/she wants to buy from manufacturers/dealers, so there is a
chance of upward price spiral of these goods through creation of artificial
scarcity – for example, we have seen it in the case of seeds and fertilizers. There
is also fear that in the name of DCT, the government can reduce all other kinds
of subsidies, support to agriculture and also further reduce in rural
development expenditure. If it happens, it will further impact the farmers
badly and aggravate the rural distress.
Concluding Remarks
In the long drawn structural backtails in agriculture,
where around 42 percent rural households are landless, share cropping is
significantly high and women’s largely have no land rights etc., any policy
intervention has limited scope of success. The PM-KISAN scheme, which is
supposed to transfer Rs. 6000 to SMFs bank accounts, within a year of its
inauguration has become exclusionary in nature as the government has rigidly
decided to transfer money to those beneficiaries only whose accounts are linked
with Aadhar. In the process, there has been a decline of 26 percent beneficiary
households across India between the first and third instalment. The government
should understand that merely introducing technology will not necessarily make
the system efficient or a policy successful that too in a country where land
records are outdated and where access to banking services in the rural areas are
still a distant dream.
where around 42 percent rural households are landless, share cropping is
significantly high and women’s largely have no land rights etc., any policy
intervention has limited scope of success. The PM-KISAN scheme, which is
supposed to transfer Rs. 6000 to SMFs bank accounts, within a year of its
inauguration has become exclusionary in nature as the government has rigidly
decided to transfer money to those beneficiaries only whose accounts are linked
with Aadhar. In the process, there has been a decline of 26 percent beneficiary
households across India between the first and third instalment. The government
should understand that merely introducing technology will not necessarily make
the system efficient or a policy successful that too in a country where land
records are outdated and where access to banking services in the rural areas are
still a distant dream.
The author is Assistant Professor at TISS, Hyderabad
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